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A STEP TOWARD SIMPLIFICATION
OF SEPARATION AGREEMENTS*
When a husband and wife sever their marital relation, they may
contractually determine the extent of the husband's continuing obli-
gation to support the wife by means of a separation agreement, in the
form of either a property settlement or a support agreement.' A prop-
erty settlement establishes by contract what the parties consider a fair
distribution of the realty and personalty of ascertainable value owned
by them, and, because the wife may release her right to support in
order to secure a more favorable settlement,2 may serve as a means in
determining the husband's duty to support. A support agreement, on
the other hand, is a contract by which the parties determine the
amount of alimony which the husband should pay the wife in satis-
faction of his legal obligation to support her.3 The payments usually
continue for an indefinite time,4 and therefore the amount a husband
*The importance of separation agreements may be measured to some extent
by the importance of the general subject of domestic relations. A recent survey of a
limited number of lawyers showed that of forty subjects listed, domestic relations
ranked eighth in importance as measured by the frequency with which problems
arose in that area. Laughlin, A Day's Work, 16 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 192, 199 (1959).
As of 1953, divorces were being granted in the United States at the rate of four
hundred thousand per year-a ratio of one divorce in every four marriages, as
compared with one divorce for every thirteen marriages in igoo. Lindley, Foreword
to Lindley, Separation Agreements and Ante-Nuptial Contracts at v (1953). It has
been estimated that the number of separation agreements signed each year approx-
imates the number of divorces granted. Id. at vi.
"This determination is not binding on the courts, and the agreement may be set
aside if unfair. Cronin v. Hebditch, 195 Md. 607, 74 A.2d 50 (195o); Halstead v. Hal-
stead, 74 N.J. Eq. 596, 70 At. 928 (Ch. 19o8); Haas v. Haas, 298 N.Y. 69, 8o N.E.2d
337 (i948).
-Courts are loathe to permit the wife to bargain away her right to support.
Thus, in Dworkin v. Dworkin, 247 App. Div. 213, 286 N.Y. Supp. 982 (1st Dep't
1936), it was held that an agreement which attempts to relieve the husband of the
obligation to support his wife is void if the husband gives an inadequate consider-
ation. But in Adams v. Adams, 29 Cal. 2d 621, 177 P.2d 265 (1947), it was held that
the court had no power to change the agreement of the parties when the contract
was basically for the settlement of property rights, and had been approved by the
divorce court. The validity of a waiver of the wife's claims against the husband's
estate has been upheld in numerous cases. See, e.g., In re Sturmer's Estate, 3o3 N.Y. 98,
1oo N.E.2d 155 (1951).
3The law imposes a duty upon the husband to support his wife in conformity
with his status in life. Astor v. Astor, 89 So. 2d 645 (Fla. 1956); State v. Lucas, 242
N.C. 84, 86 S.E.2d 770 (1955); Bundy v. Bundy, 197 Va. 795, 91 S.E.2d 412 (1956).
'The wife's support payments are usually terminated at her death or upon her
remarriage. Kuert v. Kuert, 6o N.M. 432, 292 P.2d 115 (1956); Austad v. Austad, 2
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may have to pay under a support agreement is not immediately ascer-
tainable, although with the use of actuarial tables one may determine
the present cash value of such an annuity. Both types of agreement
offer benefits to the parties by way of reducing litigation, curtailing
expenses, and eliminating a controversy that may cause scandal. How-
ever, these advantages may be lost because of conflicting interpreta-
tions of the provisions of the agreement and the decree that embodies
the agreement.
In the recent case of Flicker v. Chenitz,5 the Appellate Division
of the Superior Court of New Jersey considered the rights of an ex-
wife" against her former husband's estate under a separation agree-
ment. While a divor'-e suit was pending, the husband and wife entered
into an agreement 7 the first clause of which provided that the hus-
band should pay the wife one hundred and forty dollars per week
during her life "in lieu of all support, alimony and maintenance .... .s
The next five clauses settled the rights of the parties in a substantial
amount of property.9 The agreement was approved' 0 by the trial court
Utah 2d 49, 269 P. 2d 284 (1954). The parties may provide by the contract that pay-
ments shall continue regardless of remarriage, but this provision when incorporated
in a decree may be modified at a later date, Adler v. Adler, 373 Ill. 361, 26 N.E.2d 504
(1940). As to whether alimony survives the death of the husband, see note 13 infra.
The reader should note that "lump sum settlements," sometimes called "alimony
in gross," constitute another method of meeting the obligation to support, and are
subject to different rules from those governing property settlements and periodic
alimony.
555 N.J. Super. 273, 15o A.2d 688 (App. Div. 1959).
OFor convenience, the parties will hereafter be referred to as. husband and wife,
although divorced.
'The contract was not labeled either "support agreement" or "property set-
tlement." Such a designation might have aided in determining the intent of the
parties.
Si5o A.2d at 690.
The agreement between Sol and Hilda Flicker provided for property settlement
as follows: clause (2) gave the wife an undivided one-half interest in realty located
in Arlington, New Jersey; (3) gave the wife about ten thousand dollars to be re-
ceived from the sale of realty; (4) gave the wife all of the husband's interest in realty
situated at three consecutive street numbers in Newark, New Jersey; (5) conveyed
to the husband all the wife's interest in property other than that heretofore men-
tioned; (6) disposed of tax considerations as to property. Thus it is apparent that there
are substantial provisions as to support and property settlement, but the agreement
must be treated as either one or the other, unless the two types of provisions can
be treated independently as suggested later in this comment. See note 38 infra, and
accompanying text.
'The agreement may be incorporated in the decree so as to give it the full
force and effect of a decree (see, e.g., Flynn v. Flynn, 42 Cal. 2d 55, 265 P.2d 865
(1954)), or merely approved, thereby establishing the validity of the contract, but
denying decretal effect (see, e.g., McWilliams v. McWilliams, 1io Co1o. 173, 132
P.2d 966 (1942)).
CASE COMMENTS
in a subsequent divorce action, and the husband made payments in
accordance with the agreement until his death. At that time the hus-
band's executor refused to continue the weekly payments, contending
that the obligation was for the payment of alimony and as such ended
with the death of the husband. The wife sued for overdue payments
and sought an adjudication that she was entitled to receive payments
until her death. The wife's claim was denied, but on appeal the Supe-
rior Court held that the agreement could be specifically enforced after
the death of the husband, and further, that the wife or the husband's
estate could apply to the court for an order modifying the payment
provision."
In reaching the decision that the agreement could be enforced and
modified after the death of the husband, the appellate court de-
termined three issues which are pertinent to practically any discussion
of separation agreements: (i) whether the agreement survived the
death of the husband; (2) whether the agreement merged into the de-
cree of divorce; and (3) whether the provisions for monthly payments
could be modified. In the following discussion an effort will be made
to illustrate how an initial determination of the nature of the agree-
ment, i.e., property settlement or support agreement, would have
aided in the disposition of each issue.
i. Did the agreement survive the death of the husband? The Supe-
rior Court held, in accordance with the general rule, that a property
settlement survives the death of the husband.' 2 The court also held
that an agreement in the nature of alimony could likewise be enforced
after the death of the husband where, as here, the parties manifested
that intention.' 3 The latter rule is supported by authority and seems
U1io A.-d at 699.
' Anthon) v. Anthony, 94 Cal. App. 2d 507, 211 P.2d 331 (Dist. Ct. App. 1949);
Kuchenbecker v. Estate of Kuchenbecker, 4 Ill. App. 2d 314, 124 N.E.2d 52 (1955).
Cf. Moore v. Crutchfield, 136 Va. 20, 116 S.E. 482 (1923). The property agreement
also survives the remarriage of the wife, unless otherwise specified in the agreement.
Eisinger v. Eisinger, 95 So. 2d 502 (Fla. 1957); Goldfish v. Goldfish, 23o N.Y. 6o6,
13o N.E. 912 (1921).
"In re Mesmer's Estate, 94 Cal. App. 97, 270 Pac. 732 (Dist. Ct. App. 1928);
Ramsay v. Sims, 20o9 Ga. 228, 71 S.E.2d 639 (1952); Storey v. Storey, 125 Ill. 6o8, 18
N.E. 329 (1888); Southard v. Southard, 262 Mass. 278, 159 N.E. 512 (1928); Foster v.
Foster, 195 Va. 102, 77 S.E.2d 471 (1953) (dictum). It has been stated that since
the power to grant alimony is statutory, courts have no power to bind the estate
of a husband to continue the alimony payments unless the power is granted by
statute, or the parties so agree. North v. North, 339 Mo. 1226, soo S.W.2d 582 (1936);
Foster v. Foster, 195 Va. 102, 77 S.E.2d 471 (1953). Some courts require a definite
statement that alimony is to survive the husband's death. Thus an agreement to
pay the wife "so long as she shall remain single" was held not to bind the husband's
estate in Parsons v. Parsons' Estate, 70 Colo. 333, 201 Pac. 559 (1921). The same
result was reached when the promise was to pay the wife "so long as she shall live."
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clearly just, inasmuch as parties may generally bind their estates by
contract.14 But the court did not determine whether it was dealing
with a property settlement or a support agreement, nor did it follow
the trial court's determination of that question.15 While that deter-
mination was not essential to the decision as to survival, since this
separation agreement would survive regardless of its nature, it seems
only logical that the court would dispose of this basic question at its
first opportunity, thereby eliminating the discussion of the other type
of agreement from the case entirely.
2. Was the agreement merged in the decree so as to lose its char-
acter as a contract? If the agreement is one settling property rights,
the majority rule is that it may not be merged in the decree to such
an extent that it loses its character as a contract.' 6 This rule is based
upon the logic that the contract is primarily concerned with a matter
over which the courts have no control, and therefore the acquiring of
such control by merging the agreement in the decree would be an
unwarranted extension of the court's power.17 It has also been held that
even though the property settlement has been merged in the decree for
divorce, the intent of the parties prevails.18 However, if the separation
agreement is one which only provides for support, most courts agree
that a decree incorporating (as opposed to merely approving or adopt-
ing) the agreement becomes solely a decree that the husband pay
alimony,' 9 and thereafter the rights of the parties are governed by the
decree and not the agreement.20
Wilson v. Hinman, 182 N.Y. 408, 75 N.E. 236, 237 (go5). Other courts have not
been so strict. See Storey v. Storey and Southard v. Southard, supra.
16 Williston, Contracts § 1945 (rev. ed. 1938).
'1The trial court held that "the essence of the agreement was the discharge of
the marital obligation to pay alimony...." 15o A.2d at 691.
1 Gillespie v. Gillespie, 74 Ariz. 1, 242 P.2d 837 (1952); Adams v. Adams, 29
Cal. 2d 621, 177 P.2d 265 (1947); Burke v. Burke, 32 Del. Ch. 320, 86 A.2d 51 (1952);
Kuchenbecker v. Estate of Kuchenbecker, 4 111. App. 2d 379, 124 N.E. 2d 52 (1955):
Gloth v. Gloth, 154 Va. 511, 153 S.E. 879 (1930).
211n some states, the legislature has given the courts power to modify property
settlements incorporated in the decree. In these states the property settlement may
be merged in the decree and subsequently dealt with as an order of the court. See
Fla. Stat. Ann. § 65.15 (1943), and Iowa Code Ann. § 598.14 (1954)-
"8Kuchenbecker v. Estate of Kuchenbecker, 4 Ill App. 2d 314, 124 N.E.2d 52
('955)-
"The power of the court to grant alimony inconsistent with an agreement be-
tween the parties may be limited by statute. See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. § 20-109 (195o),
providing that if there is a contract between the parties and no objection is raised
as to its terms, no order directing payment of alimony shall be entered except in
accordance with that contract. It has been stated, however, that this statute does
not preclude a later modification of the decree incorporating the alimony provision.
Brinn v. Brinn, 147 Va. 277, 137 S.E. 5o3 (1927).
"'Herbert v. Riddell, 1o3 F. Supp. 369, 386 (S.D. Cal. 1952); Gavette v. Gavette,
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The language of the court in Flicker indicates that the agreement
merged in the decree for the purpose of subsequent modification, but
did not merge to the extent that it became alimony which ended at
the death of the husband.21 The distinction is a novel one, and not
necessary to the determination of the case if the court follows the rule
that the decree will survive the husband's death if based upon an agree-
ment which embodies this intention.
22
It can be seen from the foregoing discussion that the question
of merger may turn upon whether the agreement is a property settle-
ment or a support agreement. In the Flicker case the court discussed
the problem of merger as it related to support agreements, 3 but this is
in total conflict with the first sentence of the opinion which refers
to the agreement as a property settlement.24 It follows that because of
the failure to determine the nature of the agreement, no sound legal
principle can be drawn from this area of the case.
3. May the decree be modified? The determination of the nature
of the agreement is essential to the proper disposition of this facet of
the case. If the contract is an unmerged property settlement, prac-
tically all authorities agree that it may not be modified without the
consent of the parties, as there is nothing in the decree to be modi-
fied.25 Conversely, if the court is dealing with a support agreement
which has by merger become court-decreed alimony, practically all
authorities agree that it may be modified.26 Modification of a support
agreement may be more difficult to justify when one of the parties is
dead, but the better rule would seem to be that death of a party is
104 Colo. 71, 88 P.2d 964 (1939). But see, Sureau v. Sureau, 3o5 N.Y. 720, 112 N.E.2d
786 (953). When both parties are before the court and the court ratifies or incor-
porates thc agreement, the court is deemed to have passed on its legality and col-
lateral attack will be denied. Richards v. Richards, 85 Ga. App. 605, 69 S.E.2d 911
(1952); Schaht v. Schaht, 295 N.Y. 439, 68 N.E.2d 433 (1946); Vallihan v. Hughes,
196 Va. 117, 82 S.E.2d 553 (1954). But when the agreement, although brought to the
court's attention and mentioned in its findings, is not incorporated in the decree, it
is not immune from collateral attack. Flood v. Thiesing, 298 N.Y. 700, 82 N.E.2d
790 (1948).
21i5o A.2d at 697.
2Sce note 13 supra and accompanying text.
215o A.2d at 697.
-615o A.2d at 69 o .
mErwin v. Erwin, 179 Ark. 192, 14 S.W.2d 1oo (1929); North v. North, 339 Mo.
1226, 100 S.W.2d 582 (1936); Moore v. Crutchfield, 136 Va. 20, 116 S.E. 482 (1923).
The rule may be modified by statute. See note 17 supra.
-9Goldman v. Goldman, 282 N.Y. 296, 26 N.E.2d 265 (1940); Gloth v. Gloth, 154
Va. 511, 153 S.E. 879 (1930). The modification is only of the decree, and to the extent
that the agreement then differs from the decree, the agreement may be enforced
as a contract right. See, Gummerson v. Gummerson, 14 Cal. App. 2d 450, 58 P.2d 394
(Dist. Ct. App. 1936); Goldman v. Goldman, supra.
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only a factor to be considered by the court, and is not an absolute bar.
2 7
If the court had determined that this was a support agreement,
there would have' been no difficulty in justifying modification. How-
ever, since there had been no decisive adjudication as to the nature
of the agreement in Flicker, it was necessary that the court attempt to
justify modification on a ground consistent with principles governing
property settlements. In doing so the court based its decree permit-
ting modification upon the theory that the decree was for specific
performance, a remedy which may be ordered on terms inconsistent
with the agreement sued upon in order to reach a just result.28 While
this rule is applied in contract law in cases of necessity, the operation
of the decree is usually conditioned upon the consent of the party
prejudiced by the modification. 29 If that consent had been made a pre-
requisite to modification in the instant case there would be no depar-
ture from the usual rules governing property settlements, for the agree-
ment may always be changed with the consent of the parties.30 But
the fair inference from the language of the case is that if the trial
court does not abuse its discretion in modifying the decree, it will be
upheld regardless of consent of the parties.31 An early determina-
tion that the contract was a support agreement might have eliminated
the necessity for this questionable language.
4. Other problems. Custody provisions,32 tax implications, 33 and
'Pingree v. Pingree, 17o Mich. 36, 135 N.V. 923 (1912); Gunderson v. Gunder-
son, 163 Minn. 236, 203 N.W. 786 (1925).
"15o A.2d at 699.
2City of La Follette v. La Follette Water, Light & Tel. Co.," 252 Fed. 762, 773
(6th Cir. 1918); Coppage v. Equitable Guarantee & Trust Co., ii Del. Ch. 373, 102
Ad. 788 (1917); Barnett v. Cloyd's Ex'rs, 125 Va. 546, oo S.E. 674 (1919).
3017 Am. Jur. Divorce and Separation § 733 (1957).
""Therefore the decree of specific performance ... will provide that the wife or
the estate of the husband may apply to the court for modification of the decree.
15o A.2d at 699.
'The court has broad discretionary powers as to custody of children and no
agreement by the spouses can deprive the court of its jurisdiction. Koser v. Koser,
148 Neb. 277, 27 N.W.2d 162 ('947); Kunker v. Kunker, 230 App. Div. 641, 246
N.Y. Supp. 118 (3d Dep't 1930) .
"Periodic payments in the nature of alimony are taxable to the wife and de-
ductable by the husband unless the payments are installments of a specific sum,
and are to be completed in a period of ten years or less after the divorce decree or
agreement requiring the payments. On the other hand, payments pursuant to prop-
erty settlements are unaffected by this section of the Internal Revenue Code unless
made in conjunction with the husband's obligation resulting from the marriage.
Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 71(a) and (c). See Hines, Tax Aspects of Property Settlement
Agreements, 12 So. Cal. L. Rev. 386 (1939), based on similar provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1939.
CASE COMMENTS
the use of contempt power as a means of enforcement 34 are several
other important problems concerning separation agreements which
were not raised in the instant case. In some of these areas the court's
interpretation of the nature of the agreement is also a decisive factor
in determining the rights of the parties, thus magnifying the im-
portance of a clear decision on that basic issue.
Conclusion. It is submitted that the conflicting language in Flicker
is a result of the apparent dilemma in which the court found itself.
On its face the agreement appeared to be a property settlement,35 and
that interpretation effectuated the intent of the parties by providing
payments to the wife after the husband's death. However, the enforce-
ment of the agreement as written placed an undue burden on the
husband's estate, and therefore a means of revising the agreement had
to be found. The court's solution was to use the terms property settle-
ment and support agreement almost interchangeably in an effort to
reach a just result.
The problem could have been avoided had the appellate court
followed the determination of the trial court that the agreement
was basically one to pay alimony.30 By following the better rule that
alimony survives the death of the husband if based upon an agree-
ment to that effect, the problem of giving effect to the intent of the
parties would have been eliminated. Further, the alimony decree
could be modified where, as here, justification is shown.3 7
It may well be true that the Superior Court found it difficult to fol-
low the trial court's ruling as to the nature of the agreement. If that
difficulty is insurmountable, it is suggested that while the agreement
as a whole may be a property settlement, the one clause dealing with
support payments may be treated as an independent clause subject
to separate considerations as to enforcement, survival, merger and
modification. While there is little direct authority to support this
3If the order to make money payments is pursuant to a property settlement
agreement, a majority of courts hold that enforcement by contempt violates con-
stitutional immunity from imprisonment for debt. Goldfish v. Goldfish, 193 App.
Div. 686, 184 N.Y. Supp. 512 (1st Dep't 1920). Cf. Dickey v. Dickey, 154 Md. 675,
141 AtI. 387 (1928). But if an alimony agreement has been incorporated in a de-
cree, enforcement by contempt is permissible, the distinction being that alimony is
not a debt. Ex parte Dukes, 155 Ark. 24, 243 S.W. 863 (1922); Estes v. Estes, 192
Ga. 94, 14 S.E.2d 68t (1941). See Knabe v. Knabe, 176 Md. 6o6, 6 A.2d 366 (1939).
and Gloth v. Gloth 154 Va. 511, 153 S.E. 879 (1930).
*See note 9 supra.
3See note 15 supra.
OSee note 27 supra.
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